This article contributes to the debate over the effectiveness with which late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid caliphs negotiated their respective rights and duties with provincial elites during the second/eighth century. The focus is on the relationships that evolved between the caliphs and those elite families residing in the Ḥ ijāz whose ancestors had helped to establish the Muslim community and the early caliphal empire in the mid-first/seventh century. The article's analysis centres on a series of four revolts in the Ḥ ijāz over the second/eighth century and examines developments in the enthusiasm with which local elites either supported or opposed those revolts. This discussion demonstrates that, aside from a brief period during the first decades of ʿAbbāsid rule, Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs during the second/eighth century were actually quite successful at inspiring loyalty among the local elites of the Ḥ ijāz. 
ʿAbbāsid revolution and the overthrow of Marwān b. Muḥ ammad, the last of the Umayyad caliphs in the Middle East. Yet many of the Medinans who died fighting on the side of the Umayyads at Qudayd came from families -especially the Zubayrids -who had not very long before presented their own serious challenges to the Umayyads' monopoly of the caliphal office. What might have inspired this seemingly new-found loyalty?
This question, of course, invites further discussion of the dynamics in the relationships between the imperial centres of Umayyad Damascus and ʿAbbāsid Baghdad, on the one hand, and the empire's provincial elites on the other. For whatever else they may have been, the Umayyad -at least in the Marwānid period -and early ʿAbbāsid caliphsbefore things began to go wrong from the late third/ninth century -were rulers of an empire, "the geopolitical manifestation of relationships of control imposed by a state on the sovereignty of others". It is, therefore, useful to view such relationships between the caliphs and provincial elites as a manifestation of imperialism, "both the process and attitudes by which an empire is established and maintained". 3 A number of modern studies have made great headway in this effort. 4 Yet we are still some way from a critical mass of scholarship on the early Islamic "imperial rationale", the continual processes of negotiation defining the respective duties, responsibilities and rights of the central imperial/ caliphal administrations and the provincial elites. This article will focus on how one region's elites interacted with the caliphal administrations over the second/eighth century to see what that can add to our understanding of the nature, and success or otherwise, of Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid imperialism.
The Ḥ ijāzī elites are an important group to study in this respect. They were, for the most part, descendants of the original founders of the Islamic empire, whose ancestors had first established the Muslim community in western Arabia and then overseen its spectacular expansion out of the peninsula. Their history after the first, or sometimes the second, fitna has often been unfairly relegated in modern scholarship to political insignificance, but there is plenty of room to resist this interpretation. 5 They were members of families with good early Islamic credentials who had provided and continued to provide alternative claimants to the caliphate, and so the history of their interaction with the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rulers during a century in which rebellions against their claims to the caliphate were frequent is a very important part of the story of early Islamic caliphal imperialism. In a relatively recent book, based primarily on the study of genealogical works, Asad Ahmed has done fantastic work in examining the political fortunes of five Ḥ ijāzī elite families over the first/seventh to third/ninth centuries, demonstrating in particular how they made use of marriage alliances to further their positions and increase their access to patronage. 6 In this article, I want to take a slightly different approach and focus more directly upon the actions of these elite families when violent revolts offered them an opportunity to express more directly their grievances with the central caliphal regimes. Taking a perspective across the second/eighth century also allows us to compare the relative effectiveness of late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid policies aimed at ensuring the loyalty of provincial elites.
The "imperial rationale" and provincial elites
All imperial administrations, of course, make demands on their provincial subjects. For the most part, these demands are not particularly complicated. The most obvious demand that Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs made of their subjects was the payment of taxes, either in kind or in coin, or sometimes a mixture of the two. The tax burden was certainly not shared equally among all the empire's subjects -the burden was usually heavier on non-Muslims and there were also distinctions between Muslims as wellbut, broadly speaking, there are two particularly commonly encountered types of regular taxation: poll taxes and land taxes. There was also a variety of each of these types; land taxes, for example, were collected in both coin and in kind, and different rates applied to the produce of different categories of land.
7 Taxes were also collected at least occasionally from (semi-)nomadic groups, but how regularly and on what basis are not often clear. We hear anecdotally, for example, that one Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥ ammad b. Abī Sabra (d. 162/778-9) was in charge of collecting taxes (variously referred to in Arabic as ṣ adaqa, jibāya and masʿāh) from the Arabian tribes of Asad and Ṭ ayyiʾ.
8 Alongside taxation, the caliphal administrations would often require levies of soldiers and labourers from among their provincial subjects, the former more commonly were Muslims and the latter non-Muslims. Papyri from Umayyad Egypt, for example, refer to demands for forced labour and service for a range of projects from the maintenance of local irrigation canals, to service in the fleet, to the construction of imperial monuments in Syria. 269-83, 372-84; 3 (1912): 132-40, 369-73; 4 (1913): 87-96; 17 (1928) The final essential demand made by caliphs on provincial subjects was that they acknowledge their sovereignty, authority and right to dispense justice. This is quite a vague demand, but in practice it generally entailed accepting the governors and other officials they appointed as well as these appointees' decisions and arbitration. If local elites had a problem with an official's actions, they were to seek redress through the appropriate channels. Local elites' refusal to accept the caliph's appointments to governorships and other posts could be the source or symptom of serious rupture and, occasionally, of violent retribution.
11 In practice, caliphs and their officials had to act more through processes of negotiations, alliances and compromises with the provincial elites than through absolutist rule by diktat, but a direct challenge to the office of a caliphal official could easily be taken as a challenge to the caliph himself.
12
In return for these demands and exactions, the imperial administration itself had to offer something. 13 Perhaps the most obvious benefits that imperial rule conferred upon provincial elites were ensuring the stability of vital social, economic and cultural institutions (including the minting of coins), dispensing justice equitably and offering defence and protection against violent threats. In a recent article, Chase Robinson has actually suggested that the latter -defence and protection (Ar. ḥ imāya) -might have been perceived by provincial elites as the most important benefit that caliphal imperialism offered them. When that caliphal ḥ imāya was no longer perceived to be functioning, the imperial rationale began to be challenged.
14 Robinson cites a rather telling passage taken from al-Azdī's (d. 334/946) history of Mosul, under the year 195/810-11:
When caliphal authority (al-sulṭ ān) weakened, and the protection (al-ḥ imāya) [it afforded] diminished, the people of Mosul rallied around ʿAlī b. al-Ḥ asan al-Hamdānī [a local chieftain] so that he would take control of the region and protect its sub-districts. From this time until the passing of the Banū al-Ḥ asan, they would let enter [into the city] a caliphally appointed governor (al-wālī min wulāt al-sulṭ ān) only if they found him satisfactory, their being in effective control all the while.
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At least from al-Azdī's early-to-mid-fourth-/tenth-century perspective, the matter is clear: the caliphs could no longer guarantee security for Mosul's elites, so the latter no longer felt obliged to acknowledge the authority of the formers' appointed officials. Caliphs understandably, therefore, were interested in having the prestige of their ḥ imāya extolled for all to hear. So protection and the maintenance of social stability was a key service provincial elites expected imperial officials to provide in return for their loyalty and meeting the tax and conscription demands. A second provincial expectation would seem to have been that the caliphal government fund and carry out vital local infrastructural projects, including investment in roads, congregational mosques, irrigation works and such like. Closely linked to this, of course, was the hope of many local notables that as much as possible of the tax revenues raised in their province would actually be spent within the province. There was an acknowledgement -particularly in the richer provinces -of the necessity of some local revenues being redistributed to the caliphal centre, but the caliphal administration in the provinces was seen by many as an effective way of organising the collection and local expenditure of provincial revenues. This expectation -that as much revenue as possible stay within the province -was presumably supported by the practical difficulties that regularly transporting enormous quantities of coin from one province to the capital would have presented for caliphs and their administrators. 18 Revenues from the Jazīra and the Sawād would have been easy enough to bring to ʿAbbāsid Baghdad via the Euphrates and the Tigris, but how much Transoxanian or Khurasanian revenue actually made its way to Iraq seems, at the current state of research, to be anyone's guess.
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Some local elites would, naturally enough, have seen in the imperial administration an opportunity to improve their own status and lot in life; the caliphal government did make demands, but at the same time it offered an opportunity to some for advantageous employment and closer access to power. Just as a poet such as the aforementioned Marwān b. Abī Ḥ afṣ a could use the caliphal court to move on from an early life of relative obscurity in al-Yamāma, so too did the Umayyad and, especially, the ʿAbbāsid bureaucracies -in both Damascus/Baghdad and the provincial capitals -offer educated notables from across the caliphate an opportunity to advance their social standing and increase their wealth. 20 This also brings us to the obvious point that those provincials who did 16-17, 171-9. 18 For some discussion of this question -the extent to which provincial tax revenues were actually redistributed to the imperial centre -with regard to the Roman Empire, join the administration and the caliphal army expected the imperial centre to ensure that they were paid in a timely fashion and rewarded, when appropriate, with land grants.
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Finally, caliphal courtiers and certain theorists of political thought made the case that caliphs, as the imāms of the Muslim community, were necessary for the prosperity of that community as well as the salvation of each and every member of it. 22 It was God's caliph ʿAbd al-Malik, according to poets such as al-Akhṭ al, "through whom men pray for rain".
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It is impossible to work out how many provincial Muslims of the first-third/seventhninth centuries gave any practical credence to these claims, but we should assume that at least some did. We can end this summary of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid imperial rationale by noting that there are some explicit acknowledgements of its existence in the sources of the period. The early ʿAbbāsid Iraqi historian Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/773-4), for example, had the caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭ ālib (r. 35-40/656-661) exhort his followers:
There are duties (ḥ aqq) that you owe me and duties that I owe you. The duties that I owe you are counsel for as long as I am with you; multiplying for you your revenues (fayʾ), teaching you so you are no longer ignorant and educating you so that you can learn. The duties that you owe me are honest adherence to the oath of allegiance (al-wafāʾ bi-l-bayʿa), private and public counsel, responding when I summon you and obedience when I issue commands to you.
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The above discussion has undoubtedly given too synchronic a picture of the early Islamic imperial rationale. It should be obvious enough that there were actually a number of important developments over the period under discussion. There was continual fluctuation in which elite groups and families had access to caliphal patronage. There was also significant chronological and geographical variation in levels of taxation and the efficiency with which it was collected, whether it was to be collected in coin or in kind, and the extent to which revenues were spent locally or redistributed elsewhere. The early ʿAbbāsid period comes across in the sources as an era in which caliphal exactions came to be perceived by Muslims as well as non-Muslims as particularly harsh and modern scholars have indicated that this is because early ʿAbbāsid caliphs did indeed try harder than their Umayyad predecessors to take more revenue in coin from more people and to redistribute more of it to Iraq. 25 Provincial elites' concerns in this period are encapsulated in a wellknown and somewhat melodramatic section from the late second-/eighth-century Syriac Chronicle of Zuqnīn about the "years of affliction" that accompanied the governorship in the Jazīra of Mūsā b. Muṣ ʿab in the years 1084 AG/AD 772-3 and 1085 AG/AD 773-4. 26 In general, however, in spite of these developments, over the second/eighth century we see an empire demanding taxes and loyalty/obedience alongside provincial elites hoping for protection and opportunities to further enhance their social authority and economic security. The identity of the provincial elites is another category that could vary considerably from place to place and from time to time. Even in the same place at the same time, provincial elites were hardly a homogenous group. There were military and civilian elites, Muslim and non-Muslim elites, tribal and non-tribal elites, and more besides. Even within these more specific groups, experiences and fortunes could differ dramatically.
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The Ḥ ijāzī elites who will be the focus of this article were Muslim and urban, mostly resident in Medina, the principal administrative and economic centre of the second-/eighthcentury Ḥ ijāz. There were non-Muslim communities in the northern Ḥ ijāz in this period, as well of course as non-urban elites among the (semi-)nomadic populations of western Arabia, but they will not feature much in this discussion. The Muslim, urban elites, who will be the focus of what follows, were broadly split into two categories. On the one hand, there were the descendants of the early Meccan converts to Islam (the muhājirūn) and the great Meccan families who reportedly dominated the town socially and politically before it fell to Muḥ ammad in 8/630. On the other, there were the descendants of the Medinans (the anṣ ār) who offered Muḥ ammad protection and support at the time of the hijra in 1/622. Although the discussion will centre around elites living in Medina, it is actually the originally Meccan families who were more successful than their Medinan counterparts in acquiring the quantities of land and wealth that sustained membership of the local elite.
The revolts
There were four noteworthy revolts in the second-/eighth-century Ḥ ijāz, all telescoped into a forty-year period in the middle of the century. After the Umayyads finally defeated and killed the rival caliphal claimant ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr in Mecca in 73/692, the Ḥ ijāz was a relatively stable province for over half a century. The next serious threat to Umayyad rule in the Ḥ ijāz was actually caused by an external invasion, but since the Ḥ ijāzī elites' reaction to this threat is so interesting it is worth considering here. This invasion of the Ḥ ijāz, which resulted in the brief conquest of Mecca and Medina in 129-130/747, was led by Abū Ḥ amza al-Mukhtār b. ʿAwf al-Khazrajī. Abū Ḥ amza was apparently a regular anti-Marwānid preacher in Mecca during the hajj season, but met with very little success there before the Ḥ aḍ ramī Khārijite rebel ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥ yā, known as Ṭ ālib al-Ḥ aqq, "Seeker of Truth", heard him and, recognising a kindred spirit, invited Abū Ḥ amza to accompany him back to Ḥ aḍ ramawt in 128/745-6. There, Abū Ḥ amza gave allegiance to ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥ yā as imām and swiftly led an army against Mecca, which he took without a fight during the hajj season of 129-130/747.
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As Abū Ḥ amza then led his army towards Medina, the governor of the Ḥ ijāz in that town, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān, raised a local army to meet the threat. As mentioned at the start of this article, this Medinan army was then massacred by Abū Ḥ amza's in a battle at Qudayd. 29 Various lists of those Medinans killed in this battle are offered by the sources and it is extremely interesting that a large number of 27 For just one example, the varying fortunes of the caliphate's Christian elites in the transition from Umayyad to ʿAbbāsid rule, see Philip Wood, "Christian Authority under the Early Abbasids: The Life of Timothy of Kakushta", Proche-Orient Chré-tien 61 (2011): 258-74. 28 For an account of the story so far, see al-Ṭ abarī, Taʾrīkh, II: 1942 II: -3, 1981 The principal sources for this battle are given in n. 1.
those killed belonged to Ḥ ijāzī elite families, notably Zubayrids, who at other times fiercely opposed the Umayyad family's domination of the caliphal office. 30 We should not underestimate the fear that news of the approach of the Khārijite army no doubt instilled in Medina's inhabitants, but nor should we ignore the fact that, at this time of threat to the Umayyads' control over the Ḥ ijāz by a rival claimant to the caliphal office, the elites of Medina rallied behind the reigning caliph's cause. They did not decide to use Abū Ḥ amza's threat as a pretext or opportunity to throw off the Umayyad yoke, nor did they merely sit aside to see how it played out.
A decade and a half after the successful conclusion of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, the second serious revolt broke out in Medina. In 145/762, a local Ḥ asanid (one of the two main branches of the ʿAlid family), Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥ asan, who carried the messianic titles of al-mahdī and al-nafs al-zakiyya, "the Pure Soul", was openly declared as caliph in the town. 31 In spite of the relative ease with which it was defeated militarily by ʿĪsā b. Mūsā, a nephew of the reigning caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣ ūr (r. 136-158/754-775), this revolt -together with that of Muḥ ammad's brother, Ibrāhīm, in Basra -was a very serious challenge to the still young ʿAbbāsid dynasty. Two points are worth highlighting about this revolt. First, it is very clear that Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had universal caliphal ambitions. He may have attempted to rally the inhabitants of the Ḥ ijāz to his cause in part by picking up on perceived ʿAbbāsid slights against the status of the Kaʿba, 32 but his other public pronouncements -including the sermon he delivered in Medina upon the declaration of his revolt as well as his correspondence with his ʿAbbāsid rival, Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣ ūr -make it very clear that he saw himself as the rightful imām of all the Muslims, not just of one group of them. 33 The coinage struck by his brother Ibrāhīm in Basra also makes similarly universal claims to authority.
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When ʿĪsā b. Mūsā's army was advancing upon Medina, there was actually serious debate among Muḥ ammad and his supporters about whether to stay in Medina or beat a strategic retreat to somewhere else; Egypt was a popular alternative.
35 Muḥ ammad, who is generally presented in the accounts as a fairly poor military strategist, elected against wiser advice to remain in Medina and dig a defensive trench to keep the ʿAbbāsids out, as his ancestor, the Prophet Muḥ ammad, had done to keep the Meccan polytheists out of the town. This choice aside, however, there is little evidence that he planned to make Medina or Mecca the seat of his caliphate had he succeeded in overthrowing the ʿAbbāsids.
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There is still much useful information on the Zubayrid family in Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, "Die Familie el-Zubeir", Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Hist.-Phil. Classe, 23 (1878): 3-112. Al-Ṭ abarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 197. 33 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf , ed. Madelung, II: 508; al-Ṭ abarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 197, 206, Luke Treadwell, "Qurʾanic Inscriptions on the Coins of the ahl al-bayt from the Second to Fourth Century AH", Journal of Qurʾanic Studies 14/2 (2012): 47-71, pp. 58-9. 35 Al-Ṭ abarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 227-8.
Second, in spite of these ambitions being far broader than merely catering to the desires of Ḥ ijāzī elites, his revolt did pick up serious support from among them. 36 At first glance, it is actually the lack of support from some significant quarters that comes across as notable: one of the foremost Medinan members of the Ḥ usaynid branch of the ʿAlid family, Jaʿfar al-Ṣ ādiq (d. 148/765), refused to support Muḥ ammad's uprising. Some other Qurashī families were also divided between support for Muḥ ammad and refusal to join his rebellion. In spite of those who showed themselves reluctant to join in, however, Muḥ ammad's uprising found generally widespread support amongst the Ḥ ijāz's elite families. Al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956) includes a report claiming that Muḥ ammad's followers could be found among "the descendants of ʿAlī, Jaʿfar, ʿAqīl, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭ ṭ āb and al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām, together with the rest of Quraysh and the descendants of the anṣ ār".
37 Such a sweeping assertion is, as we have seen, incorrect, but in its exaggeration it reminds us how unusual the widespread support for a Ḥ asanid revolt from other Qurashī families appeared to later historians. Jaʿfar al-Ṣ ādiq may have been a Ḥ usaynid who sat this one out, but many of his relatives joined Muḥ ammad enthusiastically. The most widespread support came from the Zubayrid family and the descendants of the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭ ṭ āb (r. 13-23/634-644). Amikam Elad even noted that, "The Zubayrids constituted the main military and administrative backbone of the rebellion". 38 One Zubayrid in particular, Ibrāhīm b. Muṣ ʿab, known as Ibn Khuḍ ayr, was singled out in several sources for his especially enthusiastic dedication to Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's cause. 40 Ibn al-Nadīm (fl.c. 377/987-8) labelled Bakkār's father, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muṣ ʿab (d. 184/800), who actually seems to have participated in Muḥ ammad's revolt, as one of the most evil of men because he was prejudiced against and maltreated ʿAlī's descendants. 41 That Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's Ḥ asanid revolt had attracted serious support from such families as the Zubayrids in itself makes it a notable episode in early Islamic history.
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The fundamental study so far is Elad, "Rebellion of Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh", 179-85, from which the following details are taken unless otherwise noted. A far more thorough investigation by Amikam Elad on this revolt has recently been published, but unfortunately I had no access to it before submitting this article: The Rebellion of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya in 145/762: Ṭ ālibīs and Early ʿAbbāsīs in Conflict (Leiden: Brill, 2016). No sooner had Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh been killed and his rebellion crushed than Medina was afflicted by violent uprising again. This revolt, known in the sources as the "uprising of the blacks" (wuthūb al-sūdān), comes across rather peculiarly in the extant narratives. It is not discussed as frequently or in nearly as much detail as the other rebellions, but there are two principal versions: that of Muṣ ʿab al-Zubayrī (d. 236/851) and al-Balādhurī (d.c. 279/892-3) -for whom Muṣ ʿab was one of the main sources -and that of al-Ṭ abarī, whose principal source was ʿUmar b. Shabba (d. 262/876). 42 There are important differences in the details provided across these extant accounts, but the general story is the same. The uprising occurred as a direct result of Medina being garrisoned for more or less the first time, as a consequence of Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's revolt, by a significant military contingent under the command of the new governor, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Rabīʿ. These ʿAbbāsid soldiers made a serious nuisance of themselves by mistreating the town's inhabitants; to compound the problem, they were being provisioned with seaborne supplies from Syria and Egypt at a time when the rest of the Ḥ ijāz's inhabitants were under an official import embargo, again a result of Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's failed uprising. 43 According to al-Ṭ abarī's more detailed version, in the midst of one dispute, a Medinan trader killed an ʿAbbāsid soldier and -this is where the narrative takes a strange turn -the slaves in Medina, led by one Wathīq, 44 revolted on behalf of their put-upon masters: "By God, we have only risen up out of scorn at what has been done to you. We stand by you and are at your disposal".
45
According to al-Balādhurī's version, the rebels even entitled their leader amīr almuʾminīn, "Commander of the Faithful", the standard title in formal protocol for the caliph. 46 Medina's elite families were somewhat alarmed by their slaves' actions, even if the latter had claimed to be acting on their behalf, and tried to urge restraint, fearing further ʿAbbāsid reprisals against the town and their families. Among those figures noted as having urged loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid caliph and his governor were the Ṭ alḥ id Muḥ ammad b. ʿImrān b. Ibrāhīm, the ʿAwfid Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿUmar, and even an Umayyad, al-Aṣ bagh b. Sufyān b. ʿĀṣ im b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān. Eventually, these wiser heads managed to prevail upon the rebels, ʿAbbāsid authority was restored relatively peacefully and the leaders of the revolt were imprisoned.
As noted, this narrative as it stands is slightly strange. The background narrative given to explain the outbreak of the revolt focuses exclusively upon the interaction of the local Medinan free population and the ʿAbbāsid caliphal administration. The Medinans had two particular concerns: the poor behaviour of the military garrison and the conduct of Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣ ūr's appointee as governor of the Ḥ ijāz, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Rabīʿ al-Ḥ ārithī. Yet those Ḥ ijāzī elites who felt affronted by this ʿAbbāsid heavy-handedness were not the ones to revolt; rather, it was the region's slaves who did so. There is, however, some faint trace of a suggestion that the Medinans may have tried to use this revolt to their advantage to get the caliph to replace The principal leader of the black slaves is named Wathīq in both al-Ṭ abarī's and Muṣ ʿab al-Zubayrī's versions, but as Ūtiyū in al-Balādhurī's, the latter name presumably being a later corruption of the former. Abū Sabra was one of the first Meccan emigrants to Medina. 47 The ʿAbbāsid caliphs frequently took local elites' refusal to acquiesce to their appointees as an instance of serious rebellion. 48 With this in mind, and coupled with the Medinans' own recent experiences of the backlash following the failure of a local revolt against al-Manṣ ūr's rule, it would not have been surprising if the local elites, had they had in mind an attempt to force the replacement of the governor, acted cautiously in doing so. Nor would it be surprising that, in the aftermath of their inability to get their man recognised as governor, they had quickly attempted to alter the record by making the revolt appear simply as a slave rebellion that was restrained by the local elites' calming influence.
The final revolt we shall deal with was another Ḥ asanid rebellion in the Ḥ ijāz, a quarter of a century after Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's. In 169/786, al-Ḥ usayn b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥ asan was proclaimed as caliph and imām in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. 49 This again was a rebellion whose participants were aiming for far more than local significance, although al-Ḥ usayn played heavily upon his geographical location in a sermon in the mosque: "I am the son of the Messenger of God, in the ḥ aram of the Messenger of God, in the mosque of the Messenger of God, atop the minbar of the Prophet of God". It is quite clear, however, that al-Ḥ usayn received virtually no support from the Ḥ ijāz's local elites, although he did apparently persuade some of the pilgrims from other regions to follow his cause. 50 He was forced to leave Medina for Mecca to try to find further support there among the hajj pilgrims, but was easily defeated by an ʿAbbāsid army at a place called 
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We should bear in mind, however, that Abū al-Faraj was a partisan author writing an apologetic and polemical history on behalf of ʿAlid rebels against Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rule, and other sources suggest that al-Ḥ usayn b. ʿAlī received nothing like widespread acceptance as caliph among the Medinans.
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On Ibn Abī Sabra, see Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭ abaqāt al-kubrā: al-qism al-mutammim li-tābiʿī ahl al-Madīna wa-man baʿdahum (min rubʿ al-ṭ abaqa al-thālitha ilā muntaṣ af al-ṭ abaqa al-sādisa), ed. Ziyād Muḥ ammad Manṣ ūr (Medina: Maktabat al-ʿUlūm wal-Ḥ ikam, 1408/1987), pp. 458-9; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, ed. al-ʿAẓ m, IX: 269; al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ alrijāl, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, volumes I-XXXV (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1402-1413/1982-1992) , For two examples concerning Mosul, see n. 11. ʿAlid revolts continued in the Ḥ ijāz throughout the third/ninth century, but they increasingly took on the appearance of banditry and were certainly not locally popular, becoming almost indistinguishable in some ways from the increasing tribal insurrections of this period, the illustrious ancestry of their leaders being all that gave them a semblance of gravity. In 251/865, for example, the Ḥ asanid Ismāʿīl b. Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm rebelled in Mecca, but his rebellion consisted of little more than looting the city, including the Kaʿba, robbing pilgrims, killing people, seizing local wealth and then replicating these actions in Medina and Jedda.
52 Increasingly, the ʿAlids (or, perhaps better, the Ṭ ālibids) of the Ḥ ijāz started to turn violently against one another.
53 In 271/884, two Ḥ usaynids -Muḥ ammad and ʿAlī, sons of al-Ḥ usayn b. Jaʿfar b. Mūsā b. Jaʿfar al-Ṣ ādiq -raided Medina, killed people and extorted money from the locals. They seem to have occupied the Prophet's Mosque, meaning that no prayer took place there, for about four weeks; a poet, perhaps called al-Faḍ l b. al-ʿAbbās al-ʿAlawī (his name changes from one source to the next), recited a lament for the destruction this raid inflicted on the town's holy sites. 54 As might be expected, there is no evidence that any of these rebels' actions endeared them or their causes to the local elites.
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Patterns and analysis
The first important trend that can be seen clearly in the history of Ḥ ijāzī revolts in the second/eighth century is that they increase in frequency in the ʿAbbāsid period. This conforms well with patterns of revolt in other provinces of the caliphate, including Egypt, Syria, the Jazīra, Iran and central Asia. 56 To infer from this newfound frequency of rebellions that the ʿAbbāsid revolution had ushered in profound changes to the imperial rationale would certainly be a plausible suggestion. As Patricia Crone has noted, "Some of the provincial troubles, of course, were of the type liable to accompany any major transfer of power … Others clearly reflect the shift from a loose conquest society to an integrated state". 57 The Umayyad caliphs, at least after the second fitna, may actually have done a better job of convincing provincial elites in some regions of the benefits of the imperial rationale than their early ʿAbbāsid successors. In support of this suggestion, it is worth remembering that the one revolt discussed here that fell within the Umayyad period, that led by Abū Ḥ amza al-Khārijī in 129-130/747, was actively fought against by the Medinan elites. (2012): 303-44, pp. 312-20; Robinson, Empire and Elites, 127-64. 57 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 71.
The second important point is that in spite of the increased frequency of revolts in the early ʿAbbāsid Ḥ ijāz, only one of these, Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's in 145/762, received any meaningful support from local elites; al-Ḥ usayn b. ʿAlī's of 169/786 seems to have found no significant levels of support at all, and the other -the slave revolt of 145/762 -is murky, although I suggested that the local elites did try to use that revolt for their own ends before backtracking quickly when it became obvious it was going nowhere. Whatever the case may, according to the extant record, that revolt received virtually no local elite support. Why, then, did Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's revolt receive considerable support when others did not, and what can the possible answers to that question tell us about the attitudes of the second-/eighth-century Ḥ ijāzī elites to late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid imperialism?
Amikam Elad has suggested that widespread non-ʿAlid support for Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's revolt was inspired by harsh ʿAbbāsid economic policies in the region -especially the confiscation of estates -against a backdrop of general economic decline in the Ḥ ijāz.
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Although such policies would no doubt cause widespread resentment and could put elites at risk of losing out to revolt, it is less clear that they can account for this instance of widespread elite participation in a Ḥ ijāzī rebellion. For one thing, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs before 145/762 do not seem to have appropriated land around Medina any more effectively than had the Umayyads in the preceding half century.
59 Second, it is not particularly clear that the northern Ḥ ijāz in general underwent a period of relative economic decline over the second/eighth century. Plenty of evidence suggests instead that meaningful economic decline only set in from the second half of the third/ninth century, before accelerating over the fourth/tenth century. 60 The mid-second/eighth century may actually have been a relatively prosperous time economically for many of Medina's elites.
Asad Ahmed, on the other hand, has convincingly argued for two developments that can help us to understand the peak of support for this one rebellion in 145/762. 61 The first of these relates to marriage patterns: Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh's Ḥ asanid family had intermarried regularly with other Medinan elite families before 145/762, but did so increasingly infrequently after the failed revolt. This era of repression, however, was eventually tempered by more reconciliatory policies as the ʿAbbāsid caliphs started to buy off many members of Medina's elite -especially Zubayrids and the descendants of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭ ṭ āb -by offering them governorships and judgeships in various provinces. As we have seen, 64 Incorporating local elite families into the ruling regime in this way was presumably calculated to demonstrate to them the benefits of the ʿAbbāsids' imperial rationale and so stop them joining any future revolts; it seems to have been quite successful.
Najam Haider has suggested that with al-Ḥ usayn b. ʿAlī's revolt of 169/786, we can see a more distinctly Shīʿī side to the rebels programme, which coincided with diminishing support for ʿAlid rebels from non-ʿAlid elites. 65 It is not absolutely clear whether one of these two developments was the cause of the other, but if the more distinctly Shīʿī side to the rebels' programme came first that may have had the effect of discouraging members of other elite families from joining the movement. This may explain why, as a last throw of the dice on the verge of defeat, al-Ḥ usayn tried to appeal to the support of Mecca's slaves (ʿabīd); if hopes of gaining any local elite support had been sacrificed in return for promoting a more radically Shīʿī message, then agitating for social revolution was a plausible if somewhat last ditch alternative. 66 This does not, however, particularly help us to explain why the earlier revolt of Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had picked up such a considerable array of support from the non-ʿAlid Medinan families.
In large part, then, it seems as though increasingly endogenous Ḥ asanid marriage patterns and the ʿAbbāsid caliphs' targeted conciliatory moves in the aftermath of the revolt of 145/762 may have made a considerable part of the difference. If we look at the history of rebellions in the Ḥ ijāz across the whole second/eighth century, however, we can also discern one other important element. There is virtually no evidence of any tradition of political regionalism among the Ḥ ijāz's elite families in the late Umayyad or early ʿAbbāsid period. These elites seem to have been totally committed to the ideal of a unified Islamic empire. They may have disapproved of individual caliphal office holders, but they did not disapprove of caliphal imperialism as a whole. It was, so they asserted of course, their own ancestors who had created this empire and both their wealth and concurrent status as elites were predicated to a large degree on this assertion; it would have been self-defeating in so many ways to respond to Umayyad or ʿAbbāsid imperialism by seeking to break away.
The elites of the Ḥ ijāz also presumably recognised that they had in many ways a significantly better deal in the imperial rationale than the leading families in other provinces. In general, the notables of Mecca and Medina seem to have expected much the same of the 64 For further details and references, see Munt, Holy City of Medina, Haider, Origins of the Shīʿa, 209. caliphal administration as their counterparts in other provinces. When it came to caliphal demands on the region, however, there were important differences. The legal theory most commonly had it that Ḥ ijāzī land could not be taxed at the higher rates applicable to much of the agricultural land in other provinces, but rather would pay only the lower ʿushr rate.
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This is part of the reason, alongside the relative paucity of good agricultural land in the region, why recorded revenues from the Ḥ ijāz were much lower than those of many other provinces.
68 Given this fairly low rate of taxation, we might also consider it extremely unlikely that a noticeable portion of the revenues raised from direct taxation of the Ḥ ijāzī elites was sent to the caliphal centre. 69 It was not a province that had to support a long-term military presence, but the infrastructural demands of the region's sacred sites and pilgrim routes -which caliphs from the Marwānid period onwards generally liked to be seen to be patronising 70 -were reasonably intensive and would have been an obvious use for the locally-raised revenue.
Ḥ ijāzī elites realised they actually had quite a good deal out of the Islamic empire and so their opposition to individual caliphs did not lead to provincialism, a desire to break away from the empire to form a distinct political entity. Actions similar to those followed by alAndalus's elites under the leadership of the Umayyad amīr ʿAbd al-Raḥ mān (I) b. Muʿāwiya (r. 138-172/756-788) after the ʿAbbāsid revolution did not appeal to most of the Ḥ ijāz's important families. Their opposition to particular caliphs and dynasties, however, could be channelled into supporting an alternative candidate who looked as if he might actually have a chance of successfully overthrowing the reigning caliph and taking control of the whole empire.
The one best chance at this came with the rebellion of Muḥ ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh "alNafs al-Zakiyya" in 145/762. This revolt came only twelve years after the conclusion of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, before the new dynasty was securely established. This was a time when Muslim elites across the Islamic world had far from unanimously accepted ʿAbbāsid governance as necessarily given, and the opportunity for garnering widespread, trans-regional support for an alternative candidate from the Prophet's family would have appeared likely. 71 Again, it is worth reiterating that the fact that the revolt was easily suppressed should not ultimately detract from its seriousness at the time, especially in conjunction with the uprising of Muḥ ammad's brother, Ibrāhīm, in Basra. Many members of Medina's top families were willing to take the risk of supporting a local candidate for the caliphate, one whom they presumably expected to be more sympathetic to their concerns when in office, when they thought there was a chance he could succeed. They were not, however, willing to take that risk with the other rebels -Abū Ḥ amza al-Khārijī and al-Ḥ usayn b. ʿAlī in particular -who had far less chance of capturing the caliphate but presented a significant risk that the Ḥ ijāz might be broken away from the empire within which their prosperity and power were based. Individual caliphs and caliphal families may have been loathed in the towns of the Ḥ ijāz, but on the whole their rule benefitted the local elites far more than increasing provincial independence would have done.
In general, the project of caliphal imperialism was a great success in the Ḥ ijāz, perhaps more so than in many other provinces of the caliphate. It has long been recognised by modern historians that, after some difficulties in the early years of their rule, the ʿAbbāsids were relatively quick to realise the importance of viewing their relationship with provincial elites across the caliphate as one of negotiation rather than imposition. 72 This certainly seems to have been the case in the Ḥ ijāz from shortly after 145/762. The history of Ḥ ijāzī revolts over the second/eighth century also suggests, however, that after the defeat of Ibn al-Zubayr in 73/692 the Umayyads were no less successful in convincing the elites of that province of the benefits of their imperialism. There were no locallyinspired rebellions in the Ḥ ijāz against Umayyad rule in the half-century between the second fitna and the ʿAbbāsid revolution -which is quite remarkable when you compare that with the relatively frequent episodes of opposition they encountered in some other provinces -and, when an external revolt did come to Mecca and Medina, their inhabitants actively fought with the Umayyad ruling authorities against it. This may have been a Khārijite revolt and one originating in another province, but it is noteworthy that in this case the local elites of the Ḥ ijāz were convinced that the deal they had with the Umayyads was one so much better that it was worth fighting and, ultimately for many of them, dying to defend. In the history of the Ḥ ijāz, as with several other provinces, it was actually the onset of ʿAbbāsid rule that ushered in an era of relative instability.
Authority as Reflected in the Ḥ adīth of al-Mahdī", in ʿAbbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, ed. John Nawas (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), pp. 39-96. 72 Kennedy, "Central Government and Provincial Élites"; Robinson, Empire and Elites, 170-1.
